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Abstrak 
 
Kekalahan Negara-negara Arab dalam Perang 6 Hari 1967 kepada Israel telah mewujudkan 
ketidakstabilan dan krisis politik dalam kalangan negara-negara jiran Palestin khususnya 
Jordan pada era 1970an. Ketika perang, ramai pelarian telah melimpah masuk dan bertebaran 
di kem-kem pelarian di seluruh Jordan. Pelarian ini kemudiannya telah menubuhkan gerakan 
militia radikal  fedayeen  bagi menentang Israel dari wilayah Jordan. Akibatnya, Amman 
menjadi bandar yang tidak stabil dan berbahaya. Selain itu, selepas Perang 6 Hari juga 
menyaksikan Raja Hussein telah kehilangan populariti dalam kalangan masyarakat Palestin. 
Gerakan fedayeen kemudiannya telah mula meraih sokongan para pelarian Palestin yang 
merupakan majoriti penduduk di kebanyakan bandar-bandar di Jordan dan dalam kalangan 
rakyat Jordan sendiri yang bersimpati dengan nasib para pelarian. Gerakan ini akhirnya 
muncul sebagai ancaman yang serius terhadap kepimpinan Raja Hussein.  Kajian ini akan 
menganalisis peristiwa berdarah ini dari perspektif dan metododologi sejarah dengan 
menggunakan sepenuhnya sumber dokumen-dokumen arkib yang terdapat di Arkib 
Kebangsaan England di London.  
 
Kata kunci: kebangkitan, pelarian,radikal  . 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The defeated of the Arabs in the 1967’s war to the Israeli had created instability and political 
discord in the Palestinian neighbour countries, particularly the Kingdom of Jordan in 1970s. 
During the war, a huge number of the new Palestinian refugees or displaced people (DPs) 
were influxes into the country. The Palestinian refugees who scattered in the refugee camps 
around Jordan soil than formed a radical militia movement of the fedayeen to fight against the 
Israeli occupation. As a consequence, Israel retaliation placed Amman in continuous 
instability and danger. After the war, King Hussein was also lost his popularity among 
Palestinians, Jordan citizens and the Jordanian army. With a support from the Palestinian 
refugees, who formed the majority population in many Jordan towns, as well as the Jordanian 
sympathizers, the fedayeen movement gains their popularity and eventually emerged as a 
serious political threat to the King rulership. This paper will analyse the conflict from a 
historical perspective and methodology, based on archival documents sources found at the 
National Archive of England in London.  
 
Key words: uprising, refugees, radical 
48 
The Uprising of the Fedayeen Against the Government of Jordan, 1970-1971:  
Declassified Documents from The British Archive  
Muhamad Hasrul Zakariah 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Arab-Israeli wars following 1948 caused an influx of Palestinian refugees to the Arab 
countries, particularly to the kingdom of Jordan. The surge of refugees during the Six Day 
Arab-Israeli war of 1967 increased the Palestinian population in Jordan to the point where 
there were more Palestinians than Jordanians. This increase of the population of Palestinian 
refugees later created a political threat to the Hashemite government in the 1970s. This arose 
through the establishment of structured and well organised of Palestinian militia organisations 
known as “The fedayeen”. Military activities and industrial strikes by these militant groups 
jeopardised the stability of the Jordanian government under the leadership of King Hussein. In 
order to safeguard the government and his throne, the King launched a series of violent 
military operations against the fedayeen in Jordan from September 1970 to July 1971. The 
political conflict between King Hussein and the fedayeen during this period resulted in 
another ‘civil war’ between two Arab brothers in a modern era. The bloody military operation 
of 1970-71 by King Hussein successfully prevented his overthrow, but at the same time this 
tragedy witnessed another political disunity among Arab leaders. Consequently, in the 1970s, 
this faction of Arab politics diverted their main focus for a decade from resisting Israel to 
fighting their own brothers. Indeed, this tragedy created an ambivalent future and a historical 
nightmare of the Palestinian struggle for self-independence. The tragedy was another example 
of Arab political segregation and selfishness.  
 
Based on British archival documents, this paper will reveal the historical facts and 
discuss the tragedy of this violent conflict between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the 
Palestinian fedayeen in 1970 and 1971.       
 
Who were the Fedayeen ? 
 
After the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, Palestinian refugees, who were scattered 
around the border of the Jewish state, launched continuous military resistance against Tel 
Aviv. They organised guerilla movements by establishing several militia groups known as the 
fedayeen (Freedom Fighters). These armed militias, grew from militant elements within the 
Palestinian refugee population. The number and prestige of the guerilla organisations 
operating against Israel grew rapidly in the Arab world after the end of the Six Day War in 
1967. Unification has long been the aim of the Palestine guerrilla leaders, but such are the 
ideological, personal and political differences which divide them, that this proved wholly 
impossible until February 1969, when a number of major organisations united to form the 
Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC) for operational direction of their military wings. 
The command consisted of Al-Sifah, (a military wing of Al-Fatah), The Palestine Liberation 
Army (PLA) and the Palestine Liberation Forces (PLF) under The Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO), Al_Saiqa under the Vanguard of the Popular War of Liberation and The 
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). The command was joined 
later by the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) and Al-Aqsa Fedayeen Front (AFF). A rough 
estimation of the command was about 10,000 members. To all appearances PASC was 
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controlled by the leadership of the most powerful of its organisations, Al-Fatah, and more 
particularly by Yasir Arafat as Chairman and Military Director of the Executive Committee.  
 
The following extract from a FCO research department memorandum gives the status of each 
of the fedayeen groups in the PASC who were actively involved in militia activities prior to 
1970 1 
 
i. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). 
This organisation has undergone a number of fundamental changes since 
its inauguration by the First Arab Summit in 1964. The PLO controlling 
the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) and the Palestine Liberation Forces 
(PLF). For above 5 years it followed the normal pattern of the Arab 
guerilla organisations, the military arm of which was the PLA which, 
however was very badly mauled in the Six Day War of 1967. From then on 
it has built itself up with the new image and under new leadership. The 
PLF was set up in 1968 for the special purpose of carrying out sabotage 
operations against the Israel. Among the leaders are Yasir Arafat and 
Zuhair Muhsin as the leader of the PLF. The combined operational 
strength of the PLA and PLF is estimated to be about 3,000. The PLO has 
the financial and political backing of the Arab League. In mid 1969 it was 
asking for £16,000,000 to consolidate Arab resistance and provide for 
families of fedayeen. 
 
      The PLO is the main representative body of the Palestine guerillas. The 
National Council has 105 members of whom 33 are from Al-Fatah, 12 
from Al-Sa’iqa and 12 from PFLFP. The PLO represented by 11 members 
of the Executive Committee, and the PLA has 5 seats. The remaining seats 
are held by various Palestinian organisations and by other liberation 
group outside PASC. Yasser Arafat is the Chairman of the Palestine 
Executive Committee. 
 
ii. The Palestine Liberation Movement (PLM) 
This group is better known as Al-Fatah, and controlling Al-Asifah. The 
movement was first founded in 1962 as a sabotage group which did not, 
however come into prominence until after the Six Day War and the 
accession to its leadership of Yasir Arafat. Its military wing, Al-Sifah, 
dates from 1964.The number of its members appeared to vary very greatly, 
but up to 1969 the operational strength estimated as 6,000 members. Its 
headquarters are at Al_Salt in Jordan. Al-Fatah claims to have no 
particular identity, and as the main prop of PASC it enjoys wide Arab 
support.  
 
iii. The Vanguard of the Popular War for the Liberation of Palestine 
(VPWLP). 
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This group also known as Al_Sa’iqa. The exact date of its formation, 
resulting from the amalgamation of about eight smaller groups including 
the Palestine Popular Liberation Front (not to be confused with The 
Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine, PFLP), is uncertain. The 
operational units of Al Sa’iqa appear to have been recruited originally 
from the Palestine Battalion of the Syrian Army. Among the leaders are 
Tahir Dablan and Yusef Al-Burji while Mahmud Mu’atir is the commando 
leader. Its operational strength estimated about 750 members. This group 
has no particular ideology but appeared to have strong relations with the 
Syrian Ba’ath. The group retains its Syrian connection, and it backed 
Al_Sa’iqa which was involved in the earliest clashes with the Lebanese 
army in May 1969. It main base of operations is in South Lebanon 
between Mount Hermon and River Hasbani, relying mainly on Syria for 
operational support. 
 
iv. The Popular Democratic Front for The Liberation of Palestine , PDFLP. 
(Al Jabhat al Sha’abiya al Democratiya li Tahrir al-Falastin)  
The front is the result of an ideological split with the PFLP early in 1969. 
Previously it had operated as a part of the PFLP under the title of Youth 
Vengeance. Among the top leaders are Nawif Hawatama, Hussein Jamal 
al Hijazi and Kamal Rifaat. The operational strength of this group prior to 
1970 uprising was 200. The group ideology is extreme left wing, with 
Chinese sympathy and little time for Arab Communist parties with the 
USSR connections.  
 
v. The Arab Liberation Front ( Jabhat al _Tahrir al Arabiya) 
The front came into being in January 1969 with the support of the Iraqi 
government largely for the purpose of countering bad publicity following 
the closing down of al-Fatah and other Palestinian offices in Baghdad, 
and of Iraqi training camps for guerrillas. Among the top leaders is 
Shahrir Yusof with an active operational strength which is probably under 
100. The ideology of this group is to be pursuing the pan-Arab interest 
rather than those of regional nationalism. But it is in fact the creature of 
the right wing, Iraqi Ba’ath. The finances of this group largely depended 
on the support of the Iraqi government and their militias are trained by the 
Iraqi army, mainly in Jordan. 
 
vi. Al-Aqsa Fedayeen Front, AFF ( Jabhat Fida’i al Aqsa) 
This group becomes an independent group in August 1969 as the result of 
break away from the PFLP. It’s comprised largely of members of the one 
time Palestine Liberation Front. It also called itself the General Command 
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (GCPF). Among its 
top leaders are Ahmed Jibrael, Ali Burnak and Fadlalah Sharour. The 
operational strength estimated less than 150. The base of this group is at 
Irbid. 
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vii. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP. ( Al-Jabhat al 
Sha’abiya li Tahrir al Falastin)  
The front was set up in 1967 for the purpose of carrying out guerilla 
operations against the Israel, and was itself the result of merger of several 
smaller groups (the most important being the Palestine Liberation Front, 
PLF) all of which at one time or another had had connections with the 
Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). The PFLP led by George Habbash. 
The number of the members approximately 900 strength. This group 
considered as revolutionary ideology group but fairly middle of the road 
of the Arab Nationalist. Financially, it appeared to derive the bulk of its 
support from the United Arab Republic (UAR) with some from Iraq and 
from South Yemen.  
 
viii. The Active Organisation For The Liberation of Palestine, AOLP  (Al-
Hayah al Amila li Tahrir al Falastin). 
This is a splinter group which hived off from Al-Fatah as the result of 
personal differences in February 1969. Originally, this group known as 
The Working Organisation for The Liberation of Palestine. Among the 
leaders is Dr. Issam al_Sartawi who is considered too closely connected 
with the Muslim Brotherhood and with the Government of Jordan. It has 
to be believed that the numbers of its member are more then 150. 
 
ix. The Islamic Conquest (Fatah al_Islam) 
The group has operated under a number of different names but came into 
existence in its latest form in the spring of 1969 with the backing of King 
Faisal of Saudi Arabia. It nominal leader is the ageing ex-Mufti of 
Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini. The members of this group are believed 
to be not more then 100. The group received support from the Saudi 
government. Up to mid-June 1969, it was reported to have received 2 
million riyals from the Saudis.”2 
 
 
Refugees and Fedayeen activities  in Jordan, 1970 
 
The above fedayeen groups which united under the PASC were responsible for the Palestinian 
uprising and resistance against the Jordanian government in 1970 and 1971. The members of 
this militia group were mainly Palestinian refugees who were scattered throughout the Arab 
countries but particularly in Jordan. However, they were also joined by Palestinian 
sympathizers in Jordan as well as from all over the globe. The origin of this movement in 
Jordan began as a result of the creation of Israel in 1948, although the more organized and 
well- structured resistance groups only appeared in the mid 1960s. Even though the fedayeen 
emerged as a result of the Palestinian and Arab resistance against the Israelis, it was very 
difficult to indentify accurately the members of these militia groups in Jordan as they 
comprised Jordanians as well as refugees. To avoid confusion: most fedayeen were refugees 
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but not all refugees were necessarily fedayeen. Fedayeen was a militia-political group to fight 
the Israelis for the right of the Palestinians. Many of the fedayeen bases were on Jordanian 
soil because the majority of the Palestinian refugees lived in Jordan. Historically, since 1948 
there was a massive influx of Palestinian refugees’ into Jordan. Most of them lived in the 
refugee camps around Jordan and some lived in Jordan’s major towns such as Amman, Irbid, 
Ajlun and Zerka. After the Six Day War of 1967, the number of the Palestinian refugees that 
fled to Jordan increased tremendously. In a matter of years, Jordan changed not only in size 
but in character. Nearly 1 million Palestinians were expelled from their lands to Jordan after 
the 1967 war.2 The Palestinian populations on the two banks of Jordan in 1969 were estimated 
as follows: 
 
 
Table I : Estimated Population Breakdown- Jordan, 1969. 
 
A. EAST BANK 
 
East bankers 750,000 
West bankers  130,000 
Refugees: 
Old refugees 100,000  
Old refugees not in camps 190,000  
Second time refugees in camps 90,000  
Second time refugees not in 
camps 
90,000  
Displaced persons from West 
Bank and Gaza 
250,000  
 720,000 720,000 
Total East Bank 
(Palestine 53%) 
  1,600,000 
  
B. WEST BANK 
 
West Bankers  330,000 
Refugees in camps 70,000  
Refugees not in camps 200,000  
 270,000 270,000 
Total West Bank  600,000 
 
Jordan TOTAL 
(Palestinian 66%) 
 
2,200,000 
 
Sources: National Archive of England, FCO 17/1087, ‘Social Situation In Jordan, Britain and 
the New Displaced Person’, A Report by R.L Morris, 1st Secretary (Labour), British Embassy, 
Beirut, 1970. 
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Despite the statistic of the Palestinian population in Jordan as figured above, the population of 
the refugees could be seen concentrated in several towns in Jordan. These are the areas or 
towns where the fedayeen uprising broke out in 1970.  
  
 
Table II: Population of Refugee Camps in Jordan at 31 December 1969. 
 
No Name of 
Camps 
Official residence Unofficial 
Residence 
Total 
 
 Temporary 
camps 
Families Persons Families Persons Families Persons 
1 Baqa’a 6336 35887 1011 6076 7347 41963 
2 Jerash 2291 11524 - - 2291 11524 
3 Souf 1489 08088 0237 0848 1726 08936 
4 Hussen 3912 11199 0641 3975 2553 14174 
5 Marka 2600 15515 0314 1859 2914 17374 
6 Talbiya 1648 04483 0108 0805 0756 05288 
  
Total 
 
15276 
 
86696 
 
2311 
 
12563 
 
17587 
 
99259 
  
 
Regular camps 
7 Amman 
New Camp 
 
3979 
 
25216 
 
2010 
 
14360 
 
5989 
 
39567 
8 Jebal 
Hussein 
3369 21035 1020 5428 4389 26463 
9 Zerka 1549 10964 1181 5907 2730 16871 
10 Irbid 2120 13111 0620 3675 2740 16786 
  
Total 
 
11017 
 
70326 
 
4831 
 
29370 
 
15848 
 
99696 
 Notes: a. does not include an estimated 1788 babies born after June 1967 
b. does not include an estimated 4900 squatters living around the Jebel Hussein 
camps. 
 
Sources: National Archive of England, FCO 17/1087: U.N.R.W.A,   Amman, 1970. 
 
 
After the end of the Six Day War of 1967, the number of the fedayeen members 
increased, particularly among refugees in Jordan. Prior to 1970, the total of fedayeen members 
throughout the Arab world was estimated at over five to six thousand with 5,500 PLA 
(Palestine Liberation Army), together with 15 to 20 thousand militiamen stationed in Jordan.3 
The PLA was spread between Egypt, Syria, Jordan and included members under training in 
China and Korea. The bases of the fedayeen militias were in the Arab countries neighbouring 
Israel, particularly Jordan. Between 1969 and 1970, there was an average of 400 sabotage 
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activities of one sort or another per month; either firing across the borders or actual operations 
carried out by saboteurs crossing into Israel. The majority of them were from Jordan. Prior to 
the crisis in September 1970, it was estimated that the strength of the fedayeen was ten to 
fifteen thousand. The largest of the fighting group was Al Fatah military wing, known as Al-
Asifa with about eight thousand members.4 The fedayeen movement in Jordan consisted of 
twelve different organisations; the largest being al-Fatah.5 
 
The emergence of stronger resistance by the Fedayeen after the 1967 war caused 
increasing and more frequent infiltration activities against the Israelis from Jordanian soil. 
Consequently, Israeli resistance against the fedayeen activities from Jordan risked the security 
and stability of the Kingdom of Jordan led by King Hussein. For example an attack by the 
fedayeen on the Israeli port of Eilat in 1970s jeopardized the security of Jordan. 
 
“ Jordanian authorities have worked hard to prevent Fedayeen operations against 
Eilat for fear of Israeli reprisals against Aqaba…the attack of Israel (on Aqaba) will 
put Jordan at the mercy of Syria (Ba’thist and Fedayeen)”6 
 
Following the end of the 1967 war, it was estimated that more than 20,000 Fedayeen 
based in Jordan launched regular guerilla attacks against Israel at the border.7 For security 
reasons, King Hussein later decided that the activities of the fedayeen in Jordan, which he 
believed received a support from Syria, had to be stop. 
  
 “King Hussein and some (but not all) of those immediately around him would 
like to put a stop to infiltration of Syrian trained terrorists through Jordanian territory 
into Israel, since they know that the activities of these people are bound to provoke 
further Israeli reprisals which can only inflame passions, particularly amongst the 
overcrowded refugees on the East Bank, and can only make the position of the regime 
more difficult”8 
 
The campaign of King Hussein to stop fedayeen militias from using Jordan as a base to attack 
Israel created an anger and dissatisfaction in these groups. As expelled refugees without 
nation status since 1948, they believed that they had a right to be stationed in any Arab 
country in a mission to attack the Israelis. Any attempts to prevent them from such action 
would be considered as betraying the Arabs, particularly the Palestinian aspiration to regain 
their homeland from Israelis. Therefore, the fedayeen group resisted an attempt by King 
Hussein to remove them from Jordan between 1970 and 1971, which then ended with a 
bloody civil war. In an interview in Al-Ahram newspaper on 22 October 1969, their prominent 
leader, Yasir Arafat defended the policy to use Jordan as a military base; 
 
“The National Council as well as the Arab Foreign Ministers have decided that the 
Palestinian Revolution is fully entitled to fight in all places it finds its strategy 
dictating that it do so…we will fight from the Lebanon land in the same way we fight 
from the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian land. We fight the Zionist enemy”9 
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The military campaign launched by Jordan against the Palestinian fedayeen between 
September 1970 to July 1971 was approved and under full responsibility of the King. For 
example he directed the Prime Minister, Wasfi Tal in April 1971 to take a “decisive 
stand…against the handful of professional conspirators and criminals taking pleasure in 
committing criminal acts against farmers, workers, students, merchants and officials”10. 
Wasfi interpreted this order as a green light for him to launch a bloody military campaign 
against the fedayeen. He replied and promised “to cleanse all ranks from the professional 
criminal who disguise themselves as fedayeen”11. On May 1971, King Hussein again 
instructed Wasfi that “all contradictions that had infiltrated into the ranks of the resistance 
should be stamped out”. Wasfi, as before, agreed that “we should abide by our directives and 
preserve national unity, there shall be no place in our ranks for separatism (fedayeen).”12  
 
The activities of the fedayeen were not directed against Israel only, but at the same 
time towards the leadership of King Hussein. For the fedayeen, King Hussein was a failure 
and his family was blamed for the success of the Israeli invasions over Palestinian land since 
1948. In the 1970s, anti-Hussein sentiment was very strong among majority Palestinians in 
Jordan especially after the Six Days War of 1967, as reported by the British Council: 
 
“King Hussein’s grandfather is blamed for causing the refugee problem by calling on 
the Arabs of Jaffa, Haifa and elsewhere to forsake their homes, and for giving up 
Ramla and Lydda (to the Israelis) without a fight. King Hussein himself is blamed for 
having given preference to the East Bank over the West Bank during the period they 
were united under his rule; for giving the West Bank into the hands of Israel by his ill-
fated attack on the latter in 1967. And now for trying to liquidate the fedayeen, the 
only people who can be said to represent the West Bank personality…Perhaps 
because of the Israeli presence, there has been little in public of this anti-Hussein 
feeling”13 
 
 In the aftermath the 1967 war, the political influence of King Hussein as the protector 
of Palestinian rights also deteriorated. The severe loss of the Arabs, particularly Jordan, in the  
1967 war against Israel destroyed Hussein’s leadership image. He was seen as a weak leader 
and standing only as a puppet of the Western powers. Anti-Hussein or anti-Hashemite 
sentiment also grew among the Jordanians. Indeed, one of the Jordanian Palestinian 
sympathiser groups known as the Jordan Movement for the National Liberation, called for 
King Hussein to step down.14 The situation was worsened by the spread of revolutionary 
Nasserism ideology among Palestinians and Jordanians. The penetration of this extremist 
ideology strengthened anti-Hussein feeling among Palestinians.  In fact, it was believed that 
Nasser gave moral as well as material support to the anti-Hussein movement in order to topple 
the King. A British observer described this situation: 
 
“There has always been a large body of anti-Hashemite, pro-Nasser sentiment in the 
country, particularly in the refugee camps and the larger towns”. 15  
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There was also dissatisfaction within the Jordanian army with King Hussein’s strategy 
in the war of 1967. The loss of Jordan in the war destroyed army morale and, in desperation, 
King Hussein had to boost the army strength in order to face the fedayeen threat.  
 
“…the ability of the Jordanian authorities to control the fedayeen is becoming 
increasingly limited because of: 
a. the growing sympathy and in many cases active help for the fedayeen amongst 
Jordanians at all levels (including the army) and most of all among the ‘new’ refugees 
who despair of a return to the West bank by peaceful means. 
b. The active help being given to the fedayeen by the Iraqi army unit in Jordan 
c. The increasing pessimism in Jordan about a negotiated settlement in faced of the 
Israeli hardline negotiating position particularly over Jerusalem.16 
    
 
Additionally, very bad economic conditions in Jordan after the loss of the 1967 war 
added on people’s dissatisfaction towards King Hussein’s leadership. The Palestinian 
refugees in particular were disabled from integrating into socio-economic activities and the 
re-development process in Jordan. The condition created an economic turmoil among them in 
which poverty appeared as the major issue. The bad economic conditions in Jordan after the 
war created a hole for the penetration by subversive and extremist groups led by the fedayeen.  
 
“The core of the refugee problem is in the territories which comprise the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, where over half of the Palestinian refugees are concentrated. A 
factor which has worked most powerfully against the successful re-integration of the 
refugees into the Jordanian society has been the limited absorptive capacity of the 
Jordanian economy…17 
 
Subversive activities, were mainly organized by the pro-Nasser groups and the 
fedayeen also became actively involved in trade union affairs. For example they had launched 
a series of labour strikes as a strategy to paralyze the Jordanian economy after the war of 
1967. Indirectly, these industrial actions were not only to create an economic recession in 
Jordan but were also expected to mobilize people’s anger against the Hashemite government. 
For example on 21 April 1970, the Jordan Tobacco Company and Tobacco and Cigarette 
Workers Union of Jordan launched a labour strike and it was believed that the fedayeen group 
was behind this industrial action. 
  
“There is evidence that the Syrian backed fedayeen group, al- Sa’iqa is involved in the 
strike”.18 
 
The report by the British Embassy in Amman of 1970 explained the ‘invisible hand’ behind 
the series of labour strikes, including strikes by the Jordan Cement Industrial Workers and 
workers’ demonstrations at the British oil refinery in Jordan; 
 
“The fedayeen group operating under the carte blanche have understandably sought 
to influence the industrial labour force. Al Fatah claim to have organised the workers 
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in Jordan. The PDFP, Al-Sa’iqa, the Arab Liberation Front, the Popular Struggle 
Front and The Communist Party supported the demands of the cement workers.19 
 
 
In general, it was clear that the King Hussein’s leadership and government were in a 
critical condition in the aftermath of the 1967 war. The military, political and economic threat 
by the fedayeen, which received support from Jordanian sympathisers and other Arab 
revolutionary regimes especially the UAR and Syria, caused King Hussein a great political 
challenge and difficulties in retaining the throne. Furthermore, the infiltration activities by the 
fedayeen against the Israelis from Jordanian soil exposed the kingdom to reprisals from the 
Jewish regime. Therefore, the only way for Hussein to save and stabilise his government 
while regaining absolute support from his people and army was to liquidate the fedayeen 
threat from Jordanian soil completely. For him this movement was described as, “(Fedayeen)- 
the whole movement is a cancer in the body of Jordan”20. Logically, to prevent the ‘cancer’ 
from spreading, it had to be removed instantly to safeguard the whole of Jordan and preserve 
the King’s political career. 
 
A Bloody Uprising in Jordan, September 1970 to July 1971. 
 
Verious clashes between the Jordanian army and the fedayeen had occurred during February, 
April and June 1970. These clashes were the setting for major confrontations in late July. The 
fedayeen formed a united front in opposition to any settlement based on Security Council 
Resolution No. 242. The most extreme attitude was taken by the PFLP, which had earlier 
advocated and carried out attacks against Israeli aircraft and Jewish business interests in 
Europe.21 Tension had already been mounting in August and September between the 
Jordanian Army and the fedayeen, and was greatly intensified by the hijacking and detention 
of the hostages. Other major clashes between the fedayeen and Jordanian commandos took 
place in Amman on 26, 28 and 29 August where an unsuccessful attempt was made to 
assassinate King Hussein.22 On 16 September, King Hussein formed a military government 
and on 17 September fighting broken out between Hussein’s army and the guerillas in 
Amman, spreading to several towns in north Jordan.23 The war lasted for ten days and was 
ended by the Cairo Agreement on 27 September 1970.24 However the agreement did not stop 
continuous resistance of the fedayeen guerillas against the Jordanian regime. Resistance on a 
smaller scale by the fedayeen continued till mid 1971 while at the same time the military 
campaign by the King intensified.  By January 1971, the fedayeen had been squeezed out of 
all the main towns in Jordan except Irbid, Ajlun and Amman itself in which the government’s 
writ did not run, there was shooting in the town almost nightly. The fedayeen were still able, 
at will, to paralyze the commercial life of the city and hence effectively that of the country as 
a whole.25 The final battle between them occurred on July 1971. 
 
By July 1971, King Hussein of Jordan progressively pushed the fedayeen out of the 
main towns, particularly Amman, Irbid and Zerka. He allowed them to concentrate in 
specified areas, for example the Jerash/Ajlun area, but at the same time also virtually 
destroyed the fedayeen infrastructures. By the end of September 1970, the number of 
fedayeen actions had dropped to 100 per month, including those in Gaza. This was further 
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gradually reduced to 60 per month, of which only seven per month came from Jordan. By 
June 1971, in Jordan there were only 2000 to 2500 active members of al-Fatah.26 However 
these were in control of some of the main roads, such as that running from Amman to Zerka. 
In addition, they were in control of some mountain bases opposite Samaria and of course the 
large camp at Karame. On 13 to 16 of July 1971, the Jerash/Ajlun battle commenced and was 
virtually won within 3 days by the Jordanian army. The main aim of the campaign was to 
eliminate the two mountain strongholds of the fedayeen in Jebel Aqra and Jebel Atimed, as 
well as to surround the force in Ajlun. On 14th July the two Jebels had been captured and on 
the next two days, the Jordanian forces were able to concentrate on the main centers and clean 
up the Karame camp. On July, 16, the Jordanian force took one thousand prisoners to Mafraq 
for interrogation. The figures were estimated as below: 
 
  Table III : Casualties of the July 1971 Battle  
 
4-600 Were killed or wounded; 
800 Were returned to their homes after signing a statement to the 
effect that they had finished their participation in fedayeen 
activities; 
6-700 Were returned to Syria and Iraq 
600 Were captured and charged with criminal offences or for being 
members of the extremist movements such as George Habshah’s 
PFLP and are still held captive; 
100 Were “welcomed to Israel” and 
200 Centered in Salt, east of Amman, where they established a Fatah 
base but under the control of the Jordan Army 
3-400 Still remain free 
 
Sources: National Archive of England, FCO 17/1375.  A Report by the British  Embassy, Tel 
Aviv, 1971. 
 
 
The demolition of the fedayeen strongholds in July 1971 was still not the end of 
militia activities by this group. The movement still largely remained active in other Arab 
countries. After the 1971 battle, there still remained approximately 9,500 active members of 
fedayeen scattered all over Jordan’s neighbouring countries. In Lebanon, it was estimated that 
1,500 members were still active; mainly concentrated in Mount Hermon and along the 
Israel/Lebanon border, five to six miles inside Lebanon. While in Syria there were 
approximately 1,500 members including the Saiqa movement and 6,000 members of the PLA 
in South West Syria. Indeed, in Jordan there were still 200 operations launched from the Salt 
area where an estimated 300 – 400 members remained at large.27  
 
 During the conflict, both leaders accused and blamed each other as the party 
responsible for starting the war. Provocative statements made by leaders from both sides 
intensified the conflict. For example, in 8 January 1971, an open appeal was broadcast to 
Arab leaders by Yasir Arafat. In his appeals “Voice of The Palestinian Revolution”, Arafat 
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criticised the inhumanity and brutality of the Hashimite regime towards Palestinians. Below is 
a report of his statement translated from Arabic: 
  
 Brother Arab Kings and Presidents: 
 
Just after Premier Bahi al-Adgham had left Amman, the Jordanian authorities 
suddenly moved their forces to attack our military position in the places designated 
for them under the agreement. They violently shelled these positions with artillery and 
various other weapons. They also moved in their tanks and vehicles and attacked our 
positions in several areas- Umm ar-Rumman, Umm al-Amad, Umm Jawzah, Wadi al-
Haramiyyah, As-Salt, Rumaymin, Subayhah and certain other areas and the forest of 
Jerash - without any reason or justification. They also bombarded Rusayfah 
town…We appeal to you to intervene to halt this abominable crime which is being 
committed against the Palestine revolution and our heroic steadfast people, so that the 
rifles and all efforts may be directed against the Zionist enemy and so that innocent 
blood may be spared and not shed in the wrong place. As a people’s revolution, and 
martyrs, we appeal to you to shoulder your national and historic responsibility to halt 
these bloody massacres being carried out by the Jordanian authorities. This is a 
revolution until victory. 28 
         
Again on 24 to 26 January 1971, Yasser Arafat in a speech in Algeria accused Jordan, 
the US and Israel of colluding in an agreement to liquidate the fedayeen, and called upon Arab 
states to send troops to Jordan to protect the resistance movement29. However, the government 
of Jordan denied this accusation. Instead Amman accused Arafat of ‘self deception’ and 
‘fancies’ and of having deviated from the true path ‘to build personal fame and leadership at 
the expense of fedayeen action’ and ‘of having gone with the stream of political deception and 
false propaganda’.30 Indeed, the government of Jordan repeatedly denied an accusation that it 
had conspired with Israel to eliminate the fedayeen. The Jordanian government in a public 
statement quoted by The Guardian in 1971 explained; 
 
“Our masses know, just as well as Arafat that conspiracies against Commando action 
were the product of differences among those who are using it to seek their personal 
glory”.31 
 
Strong criticism of Arafat’s leadership was continuously broadcast in Amman. As a reflection 
of Arafat’s appeal to the Arab leaders to interfere in the conflict by giving military support to 
the fedayeen, Jordan’s government stated; 
  
“This is a new misorientation campaign launched by the defeatists…we assure the 
masses that Arafat’s statement is another attempt on his part to deepen divisions and 
sow differences between the Arab countries. Arafat has forgotten all about the Israeli 
occupation of Arab lands and is resorting to political trickery and false propaganda.32 
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The Prime Minister of Jordan, Wasfi Tal in his media conference on 19 July re-
emphasised the need to launch the military campaign on the fedayeen. For example, in the 
case of the military campaign in Jerash/Ajloun areas, he justified the action by saying that the 
fedayeen had been terrorising villagers in these areas, and that agriculture and the economy 
generally had suffered as a result. Wasfi Tal also claimed that, among fedayeen captured 
during the battle, 320 people were Israeli agents and that, according to Jordanian Intelligence, 
there were also about 500 people wanted by the court for various criminal offences, but the 
fedayeen leadership had done nothing to root out such elements.33 This bloody conflict that 
had started in September 1970 reached its ending with the final battle of July 1971. However, 
dissatisfaction and revenge of the militia continued to threaten the peace between them. In the 
end, it resulted in Wasfi Tal’s assassination in front of the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo on 28 
November 1971.34 
 
The post 1970-1971 Uprising in Jordan and the Fedayeen movement. 
 
Although the army met stronger resistance than it anticipated, the fighting resulted in a serious 
setback for all the fedayeen organisations. Thousands were killed during the conflict. For 
example, up to the end of September 1970, the fedayeen, unprepared for such an intensive 
campaign, suffered heavy causalities, perhaps in the region of 800 killed. They also lost large 
quantities of equipment, vital documents and organisational material. Both sides’ stocks of 
ammunition were seriously depleted. The army, on the other hand, held together well during 
the crisis and suffered almost no defections. Their reported losses were between 350-400 
killed and 2000 wounded.35 The fedayeen, then a militant Palestinian force independent of the 
Hashemite regime, was eliminated from Jordan, but the Palestinians themselves as citizens of 
Jordan remained in a majority of about two to one of the indigenous population. Apart from 
the defeated militants, for the most part lying low in sullen impotence in the refugee camps, 
the mass of Palestinians in the towns particularly in Amman, where they composed the bulk 
of business community, had, with a few notable exceptions, little love for the regime. That 
they had no stomach for the fight either, and least of all a desire for the return of the 
conditions before 1971, is of negative value in the context of rebuilding a sound and stable 
society. The morale, on the other hand, of the positive, passionate supporters of the Hashemite 
regime was higher than it has been for many years. The army, by holding together between 
September 1970 and July 1971 and by crushing the fedayeen, purged much of the humiliation 
they had felt since the debacle of June 1967. Victory closed their ranks and confirmed their 
loyalty to the king. 
 
 Despite heavy casualties on both parties, as a lesson from this conflict, King Hussein 
believed that the people of Palestine had to be united under a single flag of Jordan’s kingdom.  
Thus, he proposed the establishment of The United Arab Kingdom of Jordan and Palestine 
(UAK) in early 1972. In the announcement of his proposal on 15 May 1972, King Hussein 
drew clearly the fundamental concept of this new kingdom. Among the main features were: 
 
i. Re-organise the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan into United Arab Kingdom (UAK) 
comprised of two regions – Jordan and Palestine. A new constitution, giving each 
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region its own elected governor, its own house of deputies and its own regional 
government; 
ii. The UAK would have an elected national assembly, an executive branch and 
supreme court serving both regions, and national armed forces under the command 
of the King. The central government would also be responsible for foreign affairs, 
economic policies and other activities relating to the national interest; 
iii. The region of Jordan would to consist of the East Bank of the Jordan. The region 
of Palestine is to embrace the Israeli-occupied West Bank, plus any other 
Palestinian Arab areas recovered in a final peace settlement and whose people 
choose to join the union. Each region would have full freedom in dealing with all 
matters which do not fall under the jurisdiction of the central government. 
iv. Amman would be the capital of the UAK, as well as the capital of the Jordanian 
region. Occupied Arab Jerusalem would be the capital of the region of Palestine. 
In a state of final peace, Jerusalem should become a bridge between now divided 
believers in God, and a city of peace for the three great religions to whom it is 
holy.  
v. The king would be the Head of the state and would assume the Central Executive 
power, assisted by a central Council of Ministers. The central legislative power 
would be rested in the King and the National Assembly whose members would be 
elected by direct and secret ballot, having an equal number of members from each 
of the two regions.36 
 
The proposal by King Hussein generated a mixed response from Arab leaders who mostly 
concluded that this was another effort by the King to empower his control over the 
Palestinians, and of course to eliminate their military resistance. For the PLO, after three days 
of meeting on 16 March to discuss this idea, they rejected the whole proposal. Instead, the 
PLO’s Executive Council consistently called for the elimination of the Hashemite dynasty.  In 
its statement, the PLO indicated: 
 
“PLO which is a member of the Arab League and is recognised by the states of the 
world as the only legal representative of Palestinian people. Neither the King nor any 
other quarter is entitled to speak for this people, tamper with their fate or decide on their 
behalf. The Hashemite dynasty in Jordan, with all its history of conspiracy against our 
people and case and its role in serving imperialist objectives in the area is the subject of 
dispute. Getting rid of that dynasty and overthrowing the monarchy in Jordan now impose 
themselves as the objective at this phase which would restore matters to normal and put 
relations between Palestinian and Jordanian peoples in their true respective” 37 
 
The majority of Arab countries also rejected this proposal.  Egypt through her Presidential 
Council announced a rejection of this idea and concluded that “it represented the starting 
point of an imperialist and Zionist move to liquidate the Palestinian cause”.38 Following the 
Egyptian stands was a rejection announced by Libya (20 March), Tunisia (13 April), Algeria 
(16 March), Iraq and Syria (25 April)39. Indeed, these revolutionary Arab countries refresh 
their unconditional support to the right of Palestinians to exercise her own choice and remain 
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independent. Finally, the proposal was withdrawn after failing to gain support from the Arabs 
– particularly the PLO. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The uprising and resistance of the fedayeen towards King Hussein’s regime from September 
1970 to July 1971 was another bloody war between two brothers in modern Arab history. The 
war in one way successfully ended an attempt by the Palestinian guerillas to overthrow the 
king’s regime. However the influx of Palestinian fedayeen into Lebanese soil from Jordan as a 
result of this conflict, created another dark episode of the Palestinian tragedy. The military 
campaign by the Jordanian regime did not entirely solve the refugee anger and their struggle 
for an independent Palestinian nation after 1948. In fact, the uprising was a symbol of deep 
disappointment and suffering of the Palestinians for the failures of the international 
community to respond to their outcry since the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948.  
 
The Fedayeen were blamed for the tragedy and were portrayed as “terrorist militias” 
who committed a series of hijackings and terrorist activities. This paper is not trying to justify 
nor legalise any terrorist actions such as hijacking airplanes, the massacre of civilians or 
bombing public amenities. Absolutely, these actions must be disallowed and fully 
condemned. However, this paper shows how important it is to understand the reasons behind 
the Palestinian uprising and resistance in Jordan in the 1970s from historical perspectives. The 
establishment of the militia group among Palestinian refugees could be seen as the failures of 
refugees’ programs by the international community. The long suffering of Palestinian 
refugees since the 1940s has been translated into the establishment of political extremist and 
militia groups. Additionally, this tragedy also portrays a historical image of King Hussein as 
political desperado. King Hussein might explain that his action was necessary for security 
reasons: to avoid reprisals by the Israelis into Jordan by stopping fedayeen infiltrations. 
However, from another perspective, his action was seen as fully politically motivated. As a 
consequence of his defeat and failure in the Six Day 1967 war, King Hussein was trying to 
regain his reputation and popularity by diverting a military campaign from Israel to the 
Palestinian refugees. Sadly in this tragedy, based on archival document research, history will 
remember him as another disgraceful Arab leader who sacrificed his own brother’s blood for 
his political survival. 
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